Summary: Raboy, M., & Taras, D. (2004). Transparency and Accountability in Canadian Media Policy. Communications: The European Journal of Communication Research, 29 (1), 5-76.

Media Ethics

Raboy & Taras’s (2004) research is intent on describing the transparency and accountability of the Canadian policy system. They purport that the system is highly dependent on the role of stakeholders such as “politicians, industry lobbyists and regulators. The public is largely absent” (p. 59). Despite these influences, Raboy & Taras (2004) firmly state that there is an unprecedented amount of transparancy and responsibility that is uncomparable to other countries (p. 60). They both argue that the media system was a construction in response to the growing immigration and cultural pluralism of the Canadian landscape; the result is a “media system [that] is complex and multidimensional” (p. 61). However, the industrial landscape is wrought with powerful media conglomerates who influence “newspapers, radio and TV stations, satellite services, magazines, cable operations and sport franchises” (p. 61). In the Canadian media landscape, there are three a conglomerates who own a significant share of the media market: Bell Canada, CanWest Global and Quebec’s Quebecor. Despite this increasing consolidation, the market is relatively fragmented (p. 62).

To maintain cultural sovereignty and to empower Canadian content as well as its cultural values, the Broadcasting Act of 1991 was designed to protect the state of Canadian media industry (p. 62). In Canada, broadcasting and telecommunications are subject to federal authority and influence (p. 63). There are four ways that the media industry is effected: 1) the courts, 2) the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), 3) interest groups, and 4) industry self-regulation. Firstly, the courts have very little influence on the broadcasting system, unless contentious issues arise such as excessive violence on television, excessive television advertisements, pornography, hate laws, an individuals right to privacy and expression (p. 64). Secondly, the CRTC is a separate regulatory body that is responsible for ensuring broadcasters and telecommunications providers uphold and follow the creeds established in the Broadcasting Act and the Telecommunications Act respectively (p. 64); members of the CRTC are appointed by the federal government and are “divided between two often feuding government departments: Industry and Heritage”(p. 65). However, policy analysts feel that the CRTC “has failed to promote cultural policy objectives with any real stringency” (p. 65) because it has allowed the expansion of concentration ownership and has never once revoked a broadcasting license and “loosened programming requirements” (p. 65-66) and inevitably reducing the quality of Canadian content programming. Thirdly, there is heavy influence coming from interest groups who are determined to shape, alter and benefit policy for themselves (p. 66). Lastly, the CRTC is a heavy believer in industrial self-regulation which they depend on organizations to uphold the Broadcasting Act and Telecommunications Act. Industry self-regulation may not fully be in the public interest according to Raboy and Taras (2006) because certain telecommunications complaint operators may be reluctant to pursue complaints rigorously than if it were governed and instructed by a legitimate regulator.

To understand the influence of these methods of transparency and accountability, in 2003 the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage (Committee) published a detailed report regarding the state of Canadian Broadcasting (Lincoln Report). This report discussed “virtually every aspect of Canadian broadcasting policy” (p. 70). During this time, interest groups were intent on influencing the Committee report (p. 70). The report urged the government to help the CBC meet its mandate and increase its funding in order to satisfy is obligations (p. 71). It became an ultimate testament to the apparent transparency and accountability of Canada’s policy-making landscape (p. 70). The Committee proposed a Broadcasting Monitor which would “report annually to Parliament on how well the objectives of the Broadcasting Act were being met” (p. 72) and would eventually produce a balanced system. Following the conclusion of the Lincoln Report, the government failed to adequately address the important recommendations, insisting that they would be dealt with in due course (p. 73). Essentially, the government disagreed and ignored “all of the recommendations that dealt with governance and particularly with the need for greater transparency and accountability” (p. 74). Despite this setback, the industry as a whole is in desparate need to improve and respond to issues concerning transparency and accountability in order to fully allow the public to engage in democratic processes to effect media policy.