Social Self and Socialization

Published on November 9, 2011
by The Glaring Facts

Social self and socialization comprise of an intrinsic bond absolutely inseparable in identity formation. These processes of identity formation enable one to realize their social presence as well as themselves, to achieve a state of harmonious connection with the world beyond their own and reach beyond a local community to a more global socializing world. To examine the inter-relatedness of these concepts, it is critical to review the contributions of American pragmatists Berger & Luckman (1966), Charles Horton Cooley (1964), Richard Jenkins (2008), and especially George Herbert Mead (1934). Each of these America pragmatists have slightly differing explanations about the social self and its relationship with socialization and to understand these in relationship with Bladerunner (1982), Ghost in a Shell (1995), and Prisoner (1967).

Socialization is an imminent and inevitable consequence of human existence in society (Capozza & Brown, 2000, p. 20). The founder of socialization stated that the reason an individual receives inclusion into society is to produce “social and cultural continuity” (Clausen 1968, p. 5). Therefore, socialization plays a vital role in the prevalence of a culture and without adequate forms of socialization, a culture may cease to exist. Richard Jenkins (2008) emphasized that “individual identity formation has its roots in our earliest processes of socialization” (p. 41). Jenkins (2008) and Berger & Luckman (1966) share very identical points of views on the nature of socialization. Berger & Luckman (1966) state that there are two types of socialization: primary and secondary. The primary is the result of a child’s embrace into cultural practices and norms, its initial beginning stages of accepting societal ideologies. Following the primary, which, for Jenkins (2008) and Berger & Luckman, (1966) is the most important, comes the secondary type of socialization which manifests on the primary and continues. In this level of socialization, Jenkins (2008) states that “individuals are unique and variable, but selfhood is thoroughly socially constructed” (p. 40). He further asserts that once these individuals go beyond the primary level of socialization, the secondary becomes the true test of identification and the social self. This area is of significant interest to American pragmatists like Mead (1934) and Cooley (1964). For example, in Bladerunner (1982) Roy Batty and his compatriots were introduced to the world without primary socialization and this led to catastrophic consequence such as brutal violence and death. His individuality was compromised and completely tainted, treated as an Epsilon in the world of mass production and capital consumption. These androids then seek that secondary socialization, they attempt to redefine and understand their presence in their reality, which is filled with danger and consumption. Before Roy dies, he says to Deckard “Quite an experience to live in fear, isn’t it? That’s what it is to be a slave”. Deckard then realizes that Roy’s primary socialization had been to become a slave and Roy’s secondary redefinition of his socialization shows his humaneness, the identity struggling to be free. Simiarly, in Ghost in a Shell (1995), Kusanagi struggles to find her “ghost”, attempting to search and redefine her initial primary socialization to achieve perfection in her secondary socialization.

The social self has been subject to considerable debate, especially the concept of subjective and objective realities. Realities are in persistent change, they can be either subjective or objective argues Berger & Luckman (1966). Language and tradition have the presence of objectivity in reality, as they are the fundamental commonalities that exist within a society, however, subjective reality occurs through socialization and identity-formation. The social self exists within the perimeters of subjective reality, but selfhood is a part of a larger objective reality that is intrinsically connected with socialization. Without socialization, the social self and identity would not exist (Jenkins, 2008; Berger & Luckman, 1966; George Mead, 1934; Cooley, 1964). Berger & Luckman (1966) emphasize that identities are organism-related and that the construction of these organisms limits its ability to socially construct reality (p. 180). According to Jenkins (2008), the social self is an aggregation of the individual’s the similarities and differences with other social selves (p. 17). Stuart Hall (1996) asserted that identities are a “more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion” (p. 4-5). For example, in The Prisoner (1967), a former secret agent is abducted and entrapped in a idyllic village and is assigned a number—Number Six. According to Hall (1996), identities in these scenarios become differentiated by the barest form of valuation. Frequently, the social selves are designated by differences, for example, a Canadian may be unable to explain their identity but will surely state that he/she is definitely not an American.

For Cooley (1964) and Mead (1934), their preoccupations consist of impression management and personality analysis. Mead proposed a seminal theory titled “Symbolic Interactionism”. Cooley (1964) and Mead (1934) insisted that selves are created through communication and the social self is an ongoing process combining the “I” and the “me”. In this ongoing process, the social self is influenced by four factors: 1) the “I”, the unpredictable and unorganized self, 2) “me” the image of the social self seen through the looking glass of other people’s reactions, 3) the generalized other, and 4) significant others (Mead, 1934, p. 7). Mead stated that social selves are the result of a self-portrait constructed by the self by taking the role of the other—imagining how the “I” looks to another person. Interactionists, like Cooley (1964) and Mead (1934), call this the “looking-glass” self and insist that it is socially constructed. Essentially, the “me” is viewed as an object—the image of self seen in the looking-glass of other people’s reactions. For example, if the “I” speaks, the “me” hears and the “I” of this moment is present in the “me” of the next moment (Mead, 1934, p. 12). Furthermore, the generalized other is an organized set of information about the general expectations and attitudes of a social group. To summarize, there is no “me” at birth. The “me” is formed only through continual symbolic interaction—first with family, next with playmates, then in institutions like school. For example, in the Prisoner (1967), Number Six is surrounded by the generalized other as they attempt to normalize his existence as a number under a “big brother” influence. Such pressures are common in society, as they are the foundations of the social self (Jenkins, 2008; Berger & Luckman, 1966; George Mead, 1934; Cooley, 1964). The only way in which identities are known in a world of a collective, like Kusanagi’s police force, Number Six, and Roy Batty, is to differentiate identities so that the collective shrinks and uniqueness is recognized (Hall, 1996). In this way, the “I” can be recognized as being an entirely separate entity from the “me,” although the “me” pressures the “I” to become definitively more stable.

The relationship between the social self and socialization is extremely evident as one maintains the existence of the other. The social self maintains complete cohesion based on its societal influences, the generalized other, and primary socialization respectively. Socialization creates the social self, American pragmatists argue and that this continual revision of the social self forms an identity that only achieves recognization through differentiation.

Socialization Process

Bibliography

Berger, P. L., & Luckman, T. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: a Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books.Capozza, D., & Brown, R. (2000). Social Identity Processes. London: Sage.

Clausen, J. A. (1968). Socialization and Society. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

Cooley, C. H. (1964). Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Schocken.

Hall, S. (1996). Introduction: Who Needs Identity? Questions of Cultural Identity , 4-15.

Jenkins, R. (2008). Social Identity (3rd Edition ed.). New York: Routledge.

Markstein, G. (Director). (1967-1968). The Prisoner [Motion Picture].Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. (C. W. Morris, Ed.) Chicago: University of Chicago.

Oshii, M. (Director). (1995). Ghost in a Shell [Motion Picture].

Scott, R. (Director). (1982). Bladerunner [Motion Picture].

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